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Abstract
Many NP-hard winner determination problems admit
polynomial-time algorithms when restricting inputs to
be single-peaked. Commonly, such algorithms employ
dynamic programming along the underlying axis. We
introduce a new technique: carefully chosen integer lin-
ear programming (IP) formulations for certain voting
problems admit an LP relaxation which is totally uni-
modular if preferences are single-peaked, and which thus
admits an integral optimal solution. This technique gives
fast algorithms for finding optimal committees under the
PAV and Chamberlin–Courant voting rules under single-
peaked preferences, as well as for certain OWA-based
rules. Under single-crossing preferences, Young scores
can also be calculated. An advantage of this technique
is that no special-purpose algorithm needs to be used to
exploit structure in the input preferences: any standard
IP solver will terminate in the first iteration if the input
is single-peaked, and will continue to work otherwise.
1 Introduction
In a departure from classical voting theory, a growing lit-
erature from computational social choice has recently stud-
ied multi-winner voting rules: Given diverse preferences of
a collection of agents, instead of identifying a single best
alternative, we are aiming for a (fixed-size) set of alterna-
tives that jointly are able to represent the preferences of the
agents best. Such procedures are useful in a wide variety of
circumstances: obvious examples include the election of a
parliament, or of a committee representing the interests of
members of an organisation. Other applications can be found
in group recommendation systems, or for making decisions
about which products or services to offer: Which courses
should be offered at a university? Which movies should be
presented on an airline entertainment system?
Several attractive rules for such tasks have been designed
by researchers in political science (e.g., Chamberlin and
Courant 1983, Monroe 1995) and more recently by computer
scientists (Faliszewski et al. 2016a; Faliszewski et al. 2016b;
Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang 2015). Many of these rules
are defined in terms of some objective function: a winning
committee is a set of k candidates that maximises this ob-
jective. Unsurprisingly, then, the winner determination prob-
lems of such rules are typically NP-hard (Lu and Boutilier
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Figure 1: Typical workflow of using structured preferences
to solve voting problems. This paper shows that intermediate
steps can be skipped without loss in certain scenarios.
2011). To tackle the complexity of these problems, approxi-
mation algorithms (Skowron, Faliszewski, and Slinko 2015)
and fixed-parameter tractability approaches (Betzler, Slinko,
and Uhlmann 2013; Bredereck et al. 2015) have been devel-
oped for these problems, and integer programming formula-
tions have also been designed for them (Potthoff and Brams
1998).
Another approach to efficiently solving these winner de-
termination problems seeks to exploit underlying structure
in the preferences reported by the agents (Elkind, Lack-
ner, and Peters 2016). A particularly popular preference
restriction in this space is the notion of single-peaked pref-
erences, due to Black (1948) and Arrow (1950). Under this
model, the alternative space has a one-dimensional struc-
ture: alternatives are ordered on a left-to-right axis; and
agents’ preferences are monotonically decreasing as we move
further away from their peak (most-preferred alternative).
In particular, we can expect preferences to be structured
this way when voting over the value of a numerical quan-
tity (such as a tax rate). While single-peaked preferences
were first employed to escape impossibility results in social
choice theory (Moulin 1991), it also yields positive algorith-
mic results: Notably, Betzler, Slinko, and Uhlmann (2013)
showed that Chamberlin–Courant’s (1983) committee se-
lection rule can be computed efficiently when preferences
are single-peaked. These results can be extended to other
multi-winner voting rules (Elkind and Ismaili 2015), and to
other preference restriction such as single-crossing prefer-
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ences, or single-peakedness on trees (Skowron et al. 2013;
Elkind, Faliszewski, and Skowron 2014; Peters and Elkind
2016).
The algorithms mentioned all directly exploit the underly-
ing structure of the preferences. For example, the algorithm
due to Betzler et al. (2013) proceeds by dynamic program-
ming along the single-peaked axis. Thus, to use this algo-
rithm, we first need a procedure to uncover this axis. For-
tunately, efficient recognition algorithms for the mentioned
domains are known; in particular, a suitable axis can be found
in linear time (Escoffier, Lang, and O¨ztu¨rk 2008). Thus, the
approach to tractability via preference restrictions would
look roughly like shown in Figure 1: Given input preferences,
apply recognition algorithms for several preference restric-
tions, and if any of these tests succeed, use a special-purpose
algorithm that performs well when preferences have the un-
covered structure. If none of the tests succeed, fall back to
some (superpolynomial) general-purpose solver, such as an
integer programming solver.
But there is something awkward about linking together
this cacophony of algorithms: given the amazing progress
in solver technology in recent decades (such as witnessed in
SAT competitions or in commercial IP solvers), it might well
be faster in practice to skip these intermediate steps and go
straight to CPLEX. (This objection becomes stronger once
implementation effort is factored in.) Further, modern IP
solvers are often able to exploit underlying structure auto-
matically: experimentally, solving times on single-peaked
instances are much faster than on random instances.
While such an experimental result is nice, performance
guarantees are better. Could it be that, on certain single-
peaked instances, an IP solver performs exponentially worse
than special-purpose algorithms? The answer is no. This
paper shows that integer programming solvers will provably
terminate in polynomial time when solving certain voting
problems on single-peaked inputs. In more detail, for several
voting rules (including Chamberlin–Courant and Proportional
Approval Voting), we will design IP formulations which are
solved optimally by their LP relaxation when the preference
input happens to be single-peaked. Since all standard IP
solvers first solve the LP relaxation, they will terminate with
the correct answer in their first iteration. If the instance is
not single-peaked, the IP solver might enter further iterations
while solving – importantly, our formulations are correct
whether or not the input is single-peaked. Moreover, this
approach to achieving polynomial time efficiency does not
require separately running a recognition algorithm! The IP
solver need not know an underlying axis, or even whether
the input is single-peaked at all; the LP relaxation will just
‘magically’ have an integral solution. Our proofs rely on
establishing that the constraint matrices become totally uni-
modular in the single-peaked case. Previous applications of
this technique include certain tractable cases of the winner de-
termination problems of combinatorial auctions (see Mu¨ller
2006).
Our method also allows us to show that a conjecture due
to Elkind and Lackner (2015) is false. They consider struc-
ture in dichotomous preferences based on approval ballots,
where agents only submit a binary yes/no decision for every
candidate. In particular, they consider an analogue of single-
peakedness in this setting (which they call candidate interval
or CI), which requires there to be an ordering (axis) of the
candidates such that, for every voter, their set of approved
candidates forms an interval of the axis. They then analyse
an axiomatically particularly attractive multi-winner rule for
the approval setting, known as Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV). While Elkind and Lackner (2015) showed that PAV
is efficiently computable for a certain subclass of their CI
concept, and obtained FPT results for CI preferences, they
conjectured that PAV remains NP-hard for CI preferences
in general. This conjecture appears to be largely based on
the difficulty of solving this problem using dynamic pro-
gramming approaches that typically work in single-peaked
settings. Our method, on the other hand, allows us to find a
polynomial-time algorithm for this case, via IP solving.
We then combine the approaches for Chamberlin–Courant
and PAV to give a similar polynomial time result for so-called
OWA-based multi-winner rules in the case that preferences
are single-peaked. We further give an IP formulation that
computes Young’s voting rule efficiently for single-crossing
preferences, and close by briefly sketching applications of
our method to some further rules and settings.
2 Preliminaries
Total Unimodularity A matrix A = (aij)ij ∈ Zm×n
with aij ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is called totally unimodular if every
square submatrix B of A has detB ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. The fol-
lowing results are well-known. Proofs and much more about
their theory can be found in the textbook by Schrijver (1998).
Theorem 1. Suppose A ∈ Zm×n is a totally unimodular
matrix, b ∈ Zm is an integral vector of right-hand sides, and
c ∈ Qn is an objective vector. Then the linear program
max cTx subject to Ax 6 b (P)
has an integral optimum solution, which is a vertex of the
polyhedron {x : Ax 6 b}. Thus, the integer linear program
max cTx subject to Ax 6 b, x ∈ Zn (IP)
can be solved using its linear programming relaxation (P).
An optimum solution to (IP) can be found in polynomial
time. We will now state some elementary results about totally
unimodular matrices.
Proposition 2. If A is totally unimodular, then so is
(1) its transpose AT ,
(2) the matrix [A | −A] obtained from A by appending the
negated columns of A,
(3) the matrix [A | I] where I is the identity matrix,
(4) any matrix obtained from A through permuting or delet-
ing rows or columns.
In particular, from (3) and (4) it follows that appending a
unit column (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0)T will not destroy total unimod-
ularity. Further, using these transformations, we can see that
Theorem 1 remains true even if we add to (P) constraints giv-
ing lower and upper bounds to some variables, if we replace
some of the inequality constraints by equality constraints, or
change the direction of an inequality.
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0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0


A binary matrix A = (aij)ij ∈ {0, 1}m×n
has the strong consecutive ones property if
the 1-entries of each row form a contiguous
block, as in the example on the right. A bi-
nary matrix has the consecutive ones property if its columns
can be permuted so that the resulting matrix has the strong
consecutive ones property.
Proposition 3. Every binary matrix with the consecutive
ones property is totally unimodular.
By a celebrated result of Seymour (1980), it is possible to
decide in polynomial time whether a given matrix is totally
unimodular.
Single-Peaked Preferences Let A be a finite set of alter-
natives, or candidates, and let m = |A|. A weak order, or
preference relation, is a binary relation < over A that is com-
plete and transitive. We write  and ∼ for the strict and
indifference parts of <. A linear order is a weak order that,
in addition, is antisymmetric, so that x ∼ y only if x = y.
Every preference relation < induces a partition of A into in-
difference classes A1, . . . , Ar so that A1  A2  · · ·  Ar
and x ∼ y for all x, y ∈ At. We will say that an alternative
a ∈ At has rank t in the ordering < and write rank(a) = t;
thus the alternatives of rank 1 are the most-preferred alter-
natives under <. Finally, we say that any set of the form
{x ∈ A : rank(x) > t} is a top-inital segment of <.
a b c d e f gC C C C C C
Let C be (the strict part of) a
linear order over A; we call C an
axis. A linear order i with most-
preferred alternative p (the peak) is
single-peaked with respect to C if
for every pair of candidates a, b ∈
Awith pCbCa or aCbCp it holds that b i a. For example,
if the alternatives inA correspond to different proposed levels
of a tax, and the numbers in A are ordered byC in increasing
order, then it is sensible to expect voters’ preferences over
A to be single-peaked with respect to C. Note that  is
single-peaked with respect to C if and only if all top-initial
segments of  form an interval of C. Accordingly, we will
define a weak order < to be single-peaked with respect to
C exactly if all top-initial segments of < form an interval of
C. This concept is often known as ‘possibly single-peaked’
(Lackner 2014) because it is equivalent to asking that all the
ties in the weak order can be broken in such a way that the
resulting linear order is single-peaked.
A profile P = (<1, . . . ,<n) over a set of alternatives A
is a list of weak orders over A. Each of the orders represents
the preferences of a voter; we write N = [n] for the set
of voters. The profile will be called single-peaked if there
exists some axis C over A so that each order <i in P is
single-peaked with respect to C. A profile is single-peaked
if and only if the following matrix MPSP has the consecutive
ones property: take one column for each alternative, and one
row for each top-initial segment S of each voter’s preference
relation; the row is just the incidence vector of S. This
construction is due to Bartholdi III and Trick (1986).
Dichotomous Preferences A weak order < is dichoto-
mous if it partitions A into at most two indifference classes
A1  A2. The alternatives in A1 are said to be approved
by the voter <. On dichotomous preferences, the notion of
single-peakedness essentially coincides with the consecutive
ones property (Faliszewski et al. 2011): there needs to be an
ordering C of the alternative so that each approval set A1 is
an interval of C. Thus, Elkind and Lackner (2015) use the
name Candidate Interval (CI) for single-peakedness in this
context.
1 2 3 4 5
a b b d d
b a d b c
c d a c b
d c c a a
Single-Crossing Preferences A profile
P = (1, . . . ,n) of linear orders is
called single-crossing if voters can be or-
dered so that for all a, b ∈ A, the set of
voters who prefer a to b form an interval
of this ordering. Again, this can be phrased in terms of the
consecutive ones property of a matrix MPSC built from the
profile: take one column for each voter, and one row for each
of the m2 pairs a, b ∈ A; there is a 1 in this row for each
voter with a i b.
3 Proportional Approval Voting
In this section, we will consider Proportional Approval Voting
(PAV), a multiwinner voting rule defined for dichotomous
(approval) preferences. A naı¨ve way to form a committee
would be to select the k alternatives with highest approval
score, but this method tends to ignore minority candidates,
and so is not representative (Aziz et al. 2015a). PAV attempts
to fix this issue. The rule appears to have been first proposed
by (Thiele 1895). In the general case, a winning committee
under PAV is hard to compute (Aziz et al. 2015b).
Let us define PAV formally. Each voter i submits a set
vi ⊆ C of approved candidates (or, equivalently, a dichoto-
mous weak order with vi i C \ vi). We aim to find a good
committee W ⊆ C of size |W | = k. The intuition behind
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) is that voters are hap-
pier with committees that contain more of their approved
candidates, but that there are decreasing marginal returns to
extra approved candidates in the committee. Concretely, each
voter obtains a ‘utility’ of 1 for the first approved candidate
in W , of 12 for the second, of
1
3 for the third, and so on. The
objective value of a committee W ⊆ C is thus
∑
i∈N
1 +
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+ 1|W ∩ vi| .
The choice of harmonic numbers might seem unusual, and
one can more generally define a rule α-PAV where α ∈ Rk+
is a non-increasing scoring vector (so αi > αj when i > j).
This rule gives W the objective value
∑
i∈N
∑|W∩vi|
`=1 α`.
Then PAV is just (1, 12 ,
1
3 , . . . ,
1
k )-PAV. However, the choice
of harmonic numbers is the only vector α that lets α-PAV
satisfy an axiom called ‘extended justified representation’
(Aziz et al. 2015a), making this a natural choice after all.
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Let us now analyse our first IP formulation, for PAV.
maximise
∑
i∈N
∑
`∈[k]
α` · xi,` (PAV-IP)
subject to
∑
c∈C
yc = k (2)∑
`∈[k]
xi,` 6
∑
i approves c
yc for i ∈ N (3)
xi,` ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ N, ` ∈ [k] (4)
yc ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ C
Proposition 4. Program (PAV-IP) correctly computes an
optimal committee according to α-PAV.
Proof. In any feasible solution of (PAV-IP), the variables yc
encode a committee of size k. Fix such a committee Fix
such a committee W = {c ∈ C : yc = 1}. We show
that in optimum, the objective value of the solution is the
α-PAV-value of this committee.
Since α > 0, in optimum, as many xi,` will be set to 1 as
constraint (3) allows. Thus, for each i, exactly |W ∩vi|many
variables xi,` will be set to 1. Since w is non-increasing,
wlog, in optimum, these will be variables xi,1, . . . xi,|W∩vi|.
Then the objective value equals the α-PAV-value of W .
An interesting feature of (PAV-IP) is that the integrality
constraints (4) on the variables xi,` can be relaxed to just
0 6 xi,` 6 1; this does not change the objective value of
the optimum solution. This is because (a) in optimum, the
quantity
∑
` xi,` is integral and (b) it never pays to then have
one of the xi,` to be fractional, because this fractional amount
can be shifted to xi,`′ with (weakly) higher value.1 This ob-
servation might tell us that solving (PAV-IP) is relatively easy
as it is “close” to being an LP, and this also seems to be true
in practice. On the other hand, it is not necessarily beneficial
to relax the integrality constraints (4) when passing (PAV-IP)
to an IP solver: the presence of integrality constraints might
nudge the solver to keep numerical integrality gaps smaller.
Of course, the point of this paper is to give another reason
why (PAV-IP) is “close” to being an LP.
Proposition 5. The constraint matrix of (PAV-IP) is totally
unimodular when the input preferences are single-peaked.
Proof. We will use the manipulations allowed by Propo-
sition 2 liberally. In particular, it allows us to ignore the
constraints 0 6 xi,`, yc 6 1, and to ignore the difference
between equality and inequality constraints. Thus, after per-
muting columns corresponding to variables xi,` so that they
are sorted by i, the constraint matrix of (PAV-IP) is
APAV-IP =
[ k times︷ ︸︸ ︷− In . . . −In MPSP
0n . . . 0n 1m
]
.
If preferences P are single-peaked, then MPSP has the consec-
utive ones property, and this is also true after appending a row
1A similar property is used by Bredereck et al. (2015, Thm 1).
with all-1s. Thus,
[
MPSP
1m
]
is totally unimodular. Applying
Proposition 2 repeatedly to append negations of unit columns,
we obtain APAV-IP, which is thus totally unimodular.
Using Theorem 1, we obtain our desired result.
Theorem 6. α-PAV can be computed in polynomial time for
single-peaked approval preferences.
4 Chamberlin–Courant’s Rule
Now we leave the domain of dichotomous preferences, and
consider the full generality of profiles of weak orders. The
definition of Chamberlin–Courant’s rule (1983) is based on
the notion of having a representative in the elected com-
mittee: each voter is represented by their favourite candi-
date in the committee, and voters are happier with more
preferred representatives. Let w ∈ Nm be a (non-increasing)
scoring vector; the standard choice for w are Borda scores:
w = (m,m − 1, . . . , 2, 1). Let P = (<1, . . . ,<n) be a
profile. Then the objective value of a committee W ⊆ C
according to Chamberlin–Courant’s rule is∑
i∈N
max{wranki(c) : c ∈W}.
Chamberlin–Courant now returns any committee W ⊆ C
with |W | = k that maximises this objective.
The rule thus defined can be seen as a (non-metric) facility
location problem: each candidate c ∈ C is a potential facility
location, we are allowed to open exactly k facilities, and
the distance between customers and facilities are determined
through w. There is a standard integer programming formu-
lation for this problem using binary variables yc, denoting
whether c will be opened or not, and variables xi,c, denoting
whether facility c will service voter i.
We will need an alternative formulation based on maximis-
ing a number of points. For expositional simplicity, let’s take
w to be Borda scores; other scoring rules can be obtained
by weighting the points. Here is another way of thinking
about the objective value as defined above: each voter i can
earn a point for each rank in i’s preference order: for every
rank r ∈ [m], i earns the point xi,r if there is a commit-
tee member c ∈ W with ranki(c) > r. Then the number
of points obtained in total equals the objective values: if
i’s favourite committee member is in rank r, then i will
earn precisely wr = m − r + 1 points, namely the points
xi,r, xi,r+1, . . . , xi,m. This view suggests the following inte-
ger programming formulation, where we putw′r = wr−wr−1
and w′1 = w1.
maximise
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈[m]
w′r · xi,r (CC-IP)
subject to
∑
c∈C
yc = k (2)
xi,r 6
∑
c : rank(c)>r
yc for i ∈ N, r ∈ [m] (3)
xi,r ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ N, r ∈ [m]
yc ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ C
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Proposition 7. Program (CC-IP) correctly computes an op-
timal committee according to w-Chamberlin–Courant.
Proof. In any feasible solution of (CC-IP), the variables yc
encode a committee of size k. Fix such a committee W =
{c ∈ C : yc = 1}. We show that in optimum, the objective
value of the solution is the objective value of this committee
according to w-CC.
Since w′ > 0, in optimum, every xi,r will be set to 1
if constraint (3) allows this. This is the case iff there is a
committee member c ∈ W with ranki(c) > r, i.e., iff the
‘point’ xi,r is earned as described above. Then it is clear
that the objective of (CC-IP) corresponds to Chamberlin–
Courant’s objective.
Proposition 8. The constraint matrix of (CC-IP) is totally
unimodular when the input preferences are single-peaked.
Proof. After similar simplification as in Proposition 5 we see
that the constraint matrix of (CC-IP) is
ACC-IP =
[−Inm MPSP
0 1m
]
.
Again, if preferences P are single-peaked, then MPSP has the
consecutive ones property, and this is also true after append-
ing a row with all-1s. Thus,
[
MPSP
1m
]
is totally unimodular.
Applying Proposition 2 repeatedly to append unit columns,
we obtain ACC-IP, which is thus totally unimodular.
Theorem 9. Chamberlin–Courant with score vector w can
be solved in polynomial time for single-peaked preferences.
5 OWA-based Rules
In the philosophy behind Chamberlin–Courant, each voter
is represented by exactly one committee member, and ob-
tains all ‘utility’ through this representation. In many ap-
plication scenarios, we may instead seek multirepresenta-
tion (Skowron, Faliszewski, and Lang 2015): for exam-
ple, you might watch several of the movies offered by an
inflight-entertainment system. In such scenarios, Chamberlin–
Courant might design a suboptimal committee; Skowron et
al. (2015) introduce OWA-based multiwinner rules as a more
flexible alternative (see also Faliszewski et al. 2016b).
Given a vector x ∈ Rk, a weight vector α ∈ Rk defines
an ordered weighted average (OWA) operator as follows:
first, sort the entries of x into non-increasing order, so that
xσ(1) > . . . > xσ(k); second, apply the weights: the or-
dered weighted average of x with weights α is given by
α(x) :=
∑k
i=1 αixσ(i). For example, α = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
gives the maximum, and α = (1, 1, . . . , 1) gives the sum of
the numbers in x.
Now, a scoring vector w ∈ Nm and an OWA α define
an OWA-based multi-winner rule as follows: Given a pro-
file P , the rule outputs a committee W = {c1, . . . , ck} that
maximises the objective value∑
i∈N
α(wc1 , . . . , wck).
Thus, choosing α = (1, 0, . . . , 0) gives us w-Chamberlin–
Courant as a special case. Choosing α = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
gives us an analogue of Chamberlin–Courant where voters
are represented by their favourite two members of the com-
mittee. The OWA-based rules with α = (1, 12 , . . . ,
1
k ) and
w = (1, 0, . . . , 0) gives us PAV, when given dichotomous
preferences as input. Thus, OWA-based rules generalise both
Chamberlin–Courant and PAV, and it turns out that we can
apply our method to these rules by merging the ideas of (PAV-
IP) and (CC-IP). However, our formulation is only valid for
non-increasing OWA vectors with αi > αj whenever i > j.
Thus, for example, we exclude the rule where voters are
represented by their least-favourite committee member.2
For the IP, we again put w′r = wr − wr−1 and w′1 = w1.
maximise
∑
i∈N
∑
`∈[k]
∑
r∈[m]
α` · w′r · xi,`,r (OWA-IP)
subject to
∑
c∈C
yc = k (2)∑
`∈[k]
xi,`,r 6
∑
c : rank(c)>r
yc for i ∈ N, r ∈ [m] (3)
xi,`,r ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ N, `, r (4)
yc ∈ {0, 1} for c ∈ C
Proposition 10. If α and w are non-increasing, (OWA-IP)
correctly computes an optimal committee according to the
OWA-based rule based on α and w.
Proof sketch. Similarly to previous arguments, in optimum,
we will have xi,`,r = 1 if and only if the committee W =
{c ∈ C : yc = 1} contains at least ` candidates that voter
i ranks in rank r or above. Thus, the objective value of
(OWA-IP) agrees with the defined objective of the OWA-
based rule.
The following property is proved very similarly to before.
Proposition 11. The constraint matrix of (OWA-IP) is to-
tally unimodular when input preferences are single-peaked.
Theorem 12. OWA-based rules with non-increasing OWA
operator can be solved in polynomial time for single-peaked
preferences.
6 Young’s Rule
In contrast to the rules we have considered so far, Young’s
(1977) voting rule does not select a committee; it is a single-
winner voting rule that is based on extending Condorcet’s
rule. Given a profile P , an alternative c ∈ C is a Condorcet
winner if it beats every other alternative in a pairwise majority
contest, i.e., for every a 6= c, the number of voters in P with
c i a strictly exceeds the number of voters with a i c
2Still, this case is also efficiently solvable in the single-peaked
case: note that a voter’s least-favourite committee members will
be either the left-most or the right-most member of the committee;
thus it suffices to consider committees of size 2. This idea can be
extended to OWA operators α = (0, . . . , 0, αk−c, . . . , αk) that are
zero except for constantly many values at the end.
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(thus defined, Condorcet winners are unique). As is well-
known, not every profile admits a Condorcet winner. How
should we choose the outcome in such profiles? Young’s
rule chooses the Condorcet winners of the largest subprofiles
that do admit a Condorcet winner, where a subprofile can
be obtained by deleting voters. In other words, Young’s rule
yields all alternatives that can be made Condorcet winners
by deleting a minimum number of voters. Young’s rule also
assigns to each alternative c a score, namely the number
of voters in a maximum subprofile of P in which c is the
Condorcet winner; Young winners are the alternatives with
maximum score.
Deciding whether a given alternative is a Young winner
is Θp2-complete (Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel 2003), but
is solvable in polynomial time for single-peaked (Brandt
et al. 2015) and single-crossing preferences, essentially be-
cause such profiles always admit a Condorcet winner (in
odd electorates). Since, in general, it is hard to find a
Young winner, it is also hard to find the Young score of
a given alternative a. This latter problem admits the fol-
lowing simple IP formulation. Here, the variables di indi-
cate whether voter i is to be deleted from the profile, and
maj(b, a) = |{i ∈ N : b i a}| − |{i ∈ N : a i b}| is the
majority margin of b over a.
minimise
∑
i∈N
di (Young-IP)
subject to
∑
i∈N
bi a
di > maj(b, a) + 1 for b ∈ A \ {a}
di ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ N
While previous IPs were easy for single-peaked profiles,
this one behaves nicely for single-crossing preferences:
Proposition 13. The constraint matrix of (Young-IP) is to-
tally unimodular when input preferences are single-crossing.
Proof. After disregarding the constraints 0 6 di 6 1, the
constraint matrix is a submatrix ofMPSC, consisting of just the
rows corresponding to pairs (b, a) for b ∈ A \ {a}. If input
preferences are single-crossing, thenMPSC has the consecutive
ones property, and hence so do all its submatrices.
It follows that Young scores can be computed in poly-
nomial time when preferences are single-crossing. This in
itself is not an impressive result, since there is a very easy
direct algorithm for solving this special case,3 but the advan-
tage of the method via integer programming is that we need
not check whether P is single-crossing or not to obtain the
efficiency gains.
3Deleting a voter from a single-crossing profiles preserves single-
crossingness. The Condorcet winner of a single-crossing profile is
the top choice of the median voter. Thus, determining how many
voters need to be deleted from the extremes of the voter ordering to
make a voter with a on top the median yields the Young score of a.
See also Magiera and Faliszewski (2014).
7 Some Remarks
More than Single-Peakedness. Our polynomial-time re-
sults apply to a slightly larger class than just single-peaked
profiles: they also apply when MPSP (with an all-1s row ap-
pended) is totally unimodular but does not necessarily have
the consecutive ones property. It can be shown that this is the
case whenever P contains only two distinct voters, or, more
generally, when the set of all top-initial segments of P can
also be induced by a two-voter profile. Together with single-
peaked profiles, we conjecture that these classes of profiles
are precisely the profiles for which the relevant constraint
matrices are totally unimodular.
Egalitarian versions. We can obtain egalitarian versions of
the multi-winner rules that we have discussed by replacing
the sum over N by a minimum in their objective values (Bet-
zler, Slinko, and Uhlmann 2013). For PAV and Chamberlin–
Courant, our IP formulations can easily be adapted to answer
the question “is there a committee with egalitarian objective
value > L?” while preserving total unimodularity in the
case of single-peaked preferences. An optimum committee
can then be found by a binary search on L. However, it is
unclear how this can be achieved for OWA-based rules. It is
also unclear how to handle other utility aggregation operators
such as leximin (see Elkind and Ismaili 2015).
PAV and Voter Intervals. Elkind and Lackner (2015) define
an analogue of single-crossingness for dichotomous prefer-
ences called voter interval (VI), which requires the transpose
of MPSP to have the consecutive ones property. As for CI, they
conjectured that PAV remains hard on VI preferences. We
could not solve this problem using our method: the constraint∑
c∈C yc = k of (PAV-IP) destroys total unimodularity.
Dodgson’s rule. An alternative is a Dodgson winner if it can
be made a Condorcet winner using a minimum number of
swaps of adjacent alternatives. This number of swaps is the
Dodgson score of an alternative. Bartholdi III, Tovey, and
Trick (1989) give an IP formulation for this problem, which
is also used in the treatment of Caragiannis et al. (2009).
Sadly, while ‘most’ of the constraint matrix is again identical
to MPSP, some extra constraints (saying that the swaps in each
vote should only count once) destroy total unimodularity, so
our method cannot be employed for this formulation. Note
that while Brandt et al. (2015) give an efficient algorithm for
finding a Dodgson winner in the case of single-peaked pref-
erences, the problem of efficiently calculating scores appears
to be open and non-trivial. Maybe there is an alternative IP
formulation that can be made to work using our approach.
Kemeny’s rule. Conitzer, Davenport, and Kalagnanam
(2006) present several IP formulations for Kemeny’s rule.
The poly-size formulation they give involves constraints en-
forcing transitivity of the Kemeny ranking; these constraints
are not totally unimodular. In any case, most strategies for
calculating Kemeny’s rule first calculate all pairwise majority
margins; we might as well check for transitivity at this stage
– trying to use fancy total unimodularity is unnecessary.
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